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Recent Cases
DIVORCE-NEW JERSEY'S DECISION ON THE
ELIGIBILITY OF ASSETS FOR
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974)
On May 14, 1971, the New Jersey legislature enacted1 the first
major revisions in the state's divorce statutes since 1907.2 Among
the reforms adopted 3 was a provision which authorizes the courts
of the state, upon granting a decree of divorce, to make an "equi-
table" distribution between the spouses of assets "acquired ... dur-
ing the marriage. ' 4 This was the first such authorization for the
distribution of marital property in the history of the state.5 Yet
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1 to 2A:34-27 (1974).
2. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 203, 320 A.2d 484, 487 (1974).
3. The comprehensive nature of the other changes wrought by the
statute precludes all but the briefest mention here. Primarily, the thrust
of the legislation seeks to de-emphasize the relevancy of fault as a factor
in the breakdown of a marriage. Therefore, the statute provides the state's
first "no-fault" grounds based upon eighteen consecutive months separation
between the parties without reasonable prospect of reconciliation. The stat-
ute also broadens previously existing definitions of grounds for fault di-
vorces and eliminates recrimination and "clean hands" as defenses. Also
for the first time alimony may be awarded to either spouse. Previously,
alimony was permitted only to the wife. For a detailed analysis of the
new statute and its effects upon New Jersey divorce law, see Skoloff, The
Divorce Reform Law-A Brief Review, 94 N.J.L.J. 701 (1971); Editorial, The
New Divorce Law-Alimony and Property Distributions, 94 N.J.L.J. 556
(1971); and Note, The 1971 New Jersey Divorce Law, 25 RuTGEas L. RFV.
476 (1971).
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (1974) reads in pertinent part as fol-
lows:
In all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed
and board is entered, the court may make such award or awards
to the parties, in addition to alimony and maintenance, to effectuate
an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal,
which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of
them during the marriage.
5. Disposition of property formerly depended upon the existence of
special equities within the individual case or an agreement between the par-
ties. See Tischler, Distribution of Property Upon Divorce, 94 N.J.L.J. 1109
(1971). New Jersey's equitable distribution statute places the state within
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the legislature did not explain the meaning of the statutory lan-
guage; no further definition of the crucial terms was offered.6 Es-
pecially unclear was the meaning intended for the term "acquired."
Shortly thereafter, the superior court granted plaintiff Stephen
Painter a divorce7 from his wife, Joan, after nineteen years of mar-
riage. A determination of the assets accumulated during the mar-
riage was necessary for purposes of distribution. It was found by
the court that a substantial percentage s of the assets of each spouse
the majority of American jurisdictions which have statutes authorizing their
courts to effectuate such a distribution. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.210(6); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1974); CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800
(West. 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5(2) (1963); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1531 (1953); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 580-47 (1973); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-712 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (Smith-Hurd, 1956); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 598.21 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b) (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.190 (Supp. 1974); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 155 (West 1952);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24
(1957); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 552.19 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.54,
518.58 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-231
(1968); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19
(1968); N.J. STAT. ANw. § 2A:34-23 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 320-14
(1973); N.D. CErT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278
(1931); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(e) (1974); S.D. CODE § 14.0726 (1939);
TEN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1974); TEX. FAMILY CODE art. 3.63 (1973); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1974); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-63 (1957).
6. The task of the New Jersey courts in discerning the intent of the
legislature as to the property considered eligible for distribution was made
especially difficult by the fact that the legislative history of the provision
went unrecorded. In addition, the legislation was found to have been the
product of "original draftsmanship," not adapted from the law of any other
state. Tucker v. Tucker, 121 N.J. Super. 539, 544, 545, 298 A.2d 91, 94 (Ch.
Div. 1972). The omission of a more specific statement on this question is
perhaps attributable to the fact that the equitable distribution provision was
added as an amendment to the divorce reform bill just before its enactment
by the legislature. For the argument that the legislature deliberately left
the answers to the basic issues of property distribution to the courts because
of its realization that anticipation of all possible situations would have been
impossible, see Editorial, The New Divorce Law-Alimony and Property
Distributions, 94 N.J.L.J. 556 (1971).
7. Painter v. Painter, 118 N.J. Super. 332, 287 A.2d 467 (Ch. Div.
'1972). The divorce was sought under the new "no-fault" grounds of
eighteen consecutive months separation without reasonable prospect of
reconciliation. The fact that a divorce is based on fault does not, however,
bar the guilty party from the right to a distribution of property. Chalmers
v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 193, 287 A.2d 478, 482 (1974). Nor is the miscon-
duct to be considered as a factor in the distribution itself. See note 80 and
accompanying text infra.
8. Painter v. Painter, 118 N.J. Super. 332, 334, 335, 287 A.2d 467, 468
(Ch. Div. 1972). Plaintiff's total assets were valued at approximately
$230,500 of which nearly $143,000 had been acquired before the marriage
or through gift and inheritance during the marriage. Corresponding figures
for the defendant approximated $99,700 and $35,000 respectively. A further
had been obtained during the marriage through gifts or inheri-
tances to the parties as individuals. In making the distribution, the
superior court was required to decide whether or not the legislature
had intended that assets so obtained were to be considered "ac-
quired" and thus eligible for distribution upon divorce. The court
ruled that the term did not encompass assets so obtained.9 This
holding favored the plaintiff.10
On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the appellant did
not directly challenge the lower court's interpretation of the legis-
lative intent behind the statute's distributory provisions.1 Rather,
she contended that the provision itself was unconstitutionally
vague in failing to define adequately the meanings of "equitable"
and "acquired."'1 2 In Painter v. Painter," the supreme court re-
jected appellant's constitutional contentions. 14 However, it re-
versed the lower court's ruling on the types of assets subject to
breakdown of the assets, revealing the amount acquired by each party
through gift and inheritance during the marriage as opposed to the amount
acquired by each before the marriage, is not available. Each spouse was
then awarded $26,750, which represented a half-interest in the marital home
and its furnishings and fixtures. This left approximately $87,5,00 of the
plaintiff's assets and $64,700 of the defendant's to be distribubted between
them.
9. Id. at 336, 287 A.2d at 469. This holding was followed in Capozzoli
v. Capozzoli, 121 N.J. Super. 285, 287, 296 A.2d 661, 662 (Ch. Div. 1972);
SC v. AC, 123 N.J. Super. 566, 568, 304 A.2d 202, 204 (Ch. Div. 1972); and
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. Super. 96, 101, 312 A.2d 878, 881 (Ch. Div.
1973).
10. Id. at 337, 287 A.2d at 470. Defendant was awarded twenty per
cent of the difference of the totals of the available assets of plaintiff and
defendant. This totaled $4,874. The figures in this case illustrate the dra-
matic difference that an exclusion of assets obtained through gift or inher-
itance can make to the parties involved in the distribution. Had the assets
so obtained been included in Painter, the award of an identical percentage
to the defendant would have equaled up to $33,200, depending on what pro-
portion of the excluded assets had been obtained during the marriage by
gift or inheritance as opposed to having been acquired before the marriage.
Under the old statute, the defendant would have received nothing through
a distribution absent special equities. See note 5 supra.
11. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 202, 320 A.2d 484, 487 (1974).
12. Id.
13. 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
14. Id. at 209, 213, 214, 320 A.2d at 490, 493. On the same day of the
Painter decision, June 5, 1974, the New Jersey Supreme Court announced
its holdings in three companion cases which rejected other constitutional
challenges to the new divorce statute. In Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J.
186, 193, 320 A.2d 478, 482 (1974), the statute was held constitutional even
though it served to deprive the plaintiff of her allegedly vested right in
a condonation defense against the defendant. The defendant's alleged con-
donation had preceded the enactment of the statute, which abolished such
defense. In Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (1974),
the retrospective application of the equitable distribution provision to assets
acquired prior to its enactment was held constitutional against a claim that
such application created a deprival of property without due process. Roth-
man was cited as controlling on this issue in both Painter and Scalingi v.




distribution.15 The court held that all assets in which either spouse
gains an interest during the marriage are deemed "acquired" and
are eligible for distribution upon divorce.1 6 The court affirmed the
superior court's rulings17 that assets obtained by either spouse
before the date of marriage are ineligible for distribution.' s In-
cluded within this immune category are assets exchanged for assets
obtained before the marriage or purchased with the proceeds of
their sale where traceable.' 9 Further, the court held that increases
in the value of ineligible assets are also ineligible, even if such in-
creases occur during the marriage. 20 Finally, the court defined the
phrase "during the marriage," for purposes of distribution, as the
period between the date of the marriage ceremony and the date
of the filing of a complaint by either party requesting a decree
of divorce.2 1 This note will analyze the Painter decision and its
relation to the controversy over the eligibility of assets for distribu-
tion upon divorce. This controversy is based upon the differences
between the common law and civil code conceptions of marital
property.
Under the common law, property owned by the spouses is held
by them as tenants by the entirety. 22 This reflects the idea that,
at common law, the husband and wife are considered one.23 The
husband retains title to all property which he brings into the mar-
riage and assumes an absolute title to all chattels of the wife and
to those of her choses in action which he reduces to possession dur-
ing the marriage.2 4 Since only a married couple may hold by the
entireties,25 this form of ownership necessarily terminates upon
divorce. However, in the absence of a statute, rights which have
vested prior to a divorce remain valid.26 Therefore, upon divorce,
the husband may keep all property which was originally his as well
15. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 494 (1974).
16. Id. at 217, 320 A.2d at 495.
17. Painter v. Painter, 118 N.J. Super. 332, 336, 287 A.2d 467, 469 (Ch.
Div. 1972).
18. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974).
19. Id.
20. Id. The language of the decision indicated, however, that this
holding might not be applicable under all circumstances. See note 93 and
accompanying text infra.
21. Id. at 218, 320 A.2d at 495.
22. I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY 7 (1973). There is some confusion
whether personalty as well as realty is held by the entireties at common
law; in any case, the husband takes title to all marital property.
23. Id. at 3.
24. C. VERNER, 2 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 231 (1932).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 215.
as all of the wife's property to which he assumed title by virtue
of the marriage.1 However, the trend toward legal recognition of
the equality of the sexes has led to the modification of the harsh
rules of tenancy by the entirety in the majority of states.2 8 Those
states retaining that form of ownership generally provide by statute
that a divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy
in common with a right of partition between the spouses.
29
In comparison, the civil code, followed in eight states,30 classi-
fies both the real and personal property of either spouse as "com-
munity" or "separate."31  Community property is owned by the
spouses equally. This is based on the view that the marriage is
a partnership, to which each spouse is considered an equal contribu-
tor.32 Upon divorce, only community property may be divided.3
All property acquired by the contributions or effort of either spouse
during the marriage is considered community property.3 4 Property
obtained through gift, devise, or bequest, however, is not considered
acquired through effort and remains the separate property of the
individual recipient.
3 5
The fact that the common law makes no such distinction as
to property obtained by gift, devise, or descent was the principal
reason for the Painter court's reversal of the superior court's ruling
that such property is ineligible for distribution upon divorce.3 6
Absent express legislative direction, the supreme court was reluc-
tant to adopt a concept of the civil code into the statutes of a state
with common law origins.3 7 This reasoning, however, oversimpli-
fies the controversy. Despite its genesis within the civil code, the
idea of excluding from distribution assets obtained through gift or
inheritance has superseded the division between the "community
property" and common law states. The ineligibility of assets so
obtained has been abrogated by the case law of two community
property states.3 8 In turn, it has been adopted by statute in five
27. Id. A divorce does, however, destroy those contingent rights
which cannot vest unless the marriage continues. These include the in-
choate rights of dower and curtesy.
28. 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 697 (rev. ed. 1973).
29. Id. at 708.
30. Id. at 714. These states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. The adoption of the civil
code by these states is attributable to the heavy Spanish influence within
these states early in their development. For modifications in the original
civil code within these states, see notes 70-72 and accompanying text infra.
31. Id.
32. 1 W. DEFUNUIA, PRINCIPLES OF COMmUNTrY PROPERTY 147 (1943).
33. 4A R. PoWELL, TE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 714 (rev. ed. 1973).
34. Id.
35. 1 W. DEFUNIAK, PRINcIPLEs OF CoMMuNrrY PROPERTY 171, 172
(1943). But see note 76 infra.
36. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 216, 217, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974).
37. Id.
38. Bryant v. Bryant, 478 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Fried-
lander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 305, 494 P.2d 208, 215 (1972).
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common law states 9 and by the draftsmen of the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act.40
The Painter court was also confronted with equally contro-
versial issues regarding the distributive eligibility of property ob-
tained by means other than gift or inheritance. 41 Specifically, the
court had to determine the eligibility of property obtained by each
spouse prior to the marriage, and, in addition, property purchased
with the proceeds from the sale of such previously owned property.
The court's professed hesitancy to adopt principles of community
property was not maintained in its holdings on these questions. In-
stead, the court manifested a willingness to adopt, if not exceed,
the exclusionary rules presently prevailing among the community
property jurisdictions.
The court framed its statements as to the distributive eligibility
of assets within its answer to the constitutional question of whether
the term "acquired" as employed within the statute is sufficiently
meaningful to withstand a challenge of vagueness. This encom-
passed the most significant portion of the decision. This answer
was preceded, however, by the court's replies to two other consti-
tutional challenges against the equitable distribution provision.
The first such challenge focused upon a section 42 of the state
constitution which requires that every statute have but one object
which must be expressed within its title. It was alleged 43 that the
provision regarding equitable distribution was void because the
term "equitable distribution" had not been included within the title
of the new divorce statute.44 The court rejected this contention.
45
39. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5(2) (1974); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.190 (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1974); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.54 to 518.58 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (1974).
40. UN-IFORM MARIAGE AND DrVORcE AcT § 307, alternative §(B) (as
amended 1973). The 1973 amendment re-created § 307 into two alterna-
tives. Alternative "A" authorizes the distribution of all property "belong-
ing to either or both spouses however and whenever acquired." Alterna-
tive "B" authorizes the division of community property only.
41. See notes 63-72 and accompanying text infra.
42. N.J. CoNsT. art. IV, § 7 provides in part:
To avoid improper influences which may result from intermix-
ing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation
to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that
shall be expressed in the title.
43. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 206, 320 A.2d 484, 489 (1974).
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34-1 to 2A: 34-25 formerly L. 1948, c. 320 is
entitled as follows:
An Act concerning actions for divorce and nullity of marriage,
alimony, maintenance and custody of children, and amending N.J.S.
2A:34-1 through 2A:34-3, 2A:34-7 and 2A:34-8, 2A:34-20 and
Its reasoning followed the long-established rule that the omission
of a provision within the title of a statute does not invalidate the
neglected provision.
46
The second challenge was directed at the language of the stat-
utory provision itself. The appellant contended that the provision's
authorization of an equitable distribution was void because the term
"equitable" was impermissibly vague in describing how the trial
courts are to allocate the marital property.47 The court, however,
held that "equitable," without more, is sufficiently descriptive of
the desired distributive result.48 The decision reflects the idea that
statutory instructions to the judiciary are dismissed for vagueness
only when the instruction is so unclear as to result in arbitrary
and inconsistent adjudications.49 The court noted that such in-
structions have invariably been upheld although phrased in terms
closely synonymous with "equitable." 50  Especially significant in
this regard are the statutes in many states which provide for the
distribution of property on a "fair," "equitable," or similar basis.
None of these statutes has been invalidated on this question.5'
2A:34-23 and repealing N.J.S. 2A:34-4, 2A:34-5, 2A:34-9, 2A:34-10
and 2A: 34-22.
45. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 206, 320 A.2d 484, 489 (1974).
46. See, e.g., Howard Savings Inst. v. Kielb, 38 N.J. 186, 200, 183 A.2d
401, 408, 409 (1962); Kline v. New Jersey Racing Commission, 38 N.J. 109,
117, 183 A.2d 48, 52-53 (1962); Bucino v. Malone, 12 N.J. 330, 334, 96 A.2d
669, 676 (1953); Ott v. Braddock, 119 N.J.L. 507, 511, 197 A. 271, 274 (E.&A.
1938); Public Service Elec. & Gas Co. v. City of Camden, 118 N.J.L. 245,
249, 192 A. 222, 225 (Sup. Ct. 1937); State ex rel. Christian v. Mortland,
52 N.J.L. 521, 537, 20 A. 673, 674 (E.&A. 1890).
47. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 208, 320 A.2d 484, 490 (1974).
48. Id. at 209, 320 A.2d at 490. The court defined "equitable" as "just,
under all the circumstances of the particular case." This is the universally
accepted definition of the term. See, e.g., Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Mer-
cantile Nat'l Bank, 276 F.2d 58, 62 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. 11,360
Acres, 62 F. Supp. 968, 970 (N.D. Cal. 1945); Pearce v. Wisdom, 175 Ga.
663, 664-65, 165 S.E. 574, 575 (1932); Taylor v. School District, 128 Neb. 437,
439, 259 N.W. 168, 169 (1935).
49. See Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes,
62 H~mv. L. REv, 77, 78 (1948).
50. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 209, 320 A.2d 484, 491 (1974). How-
ever, in most instances, the issue of whether the term "equitable" would
withstand a constitutional challenge of vagueness is never specifically
raised. The question on appeal is usually whether, under the circumstances,
the result reached by the lower court was an equitable one. See, e.g., Reitz
v. Reitz, 338 Mich. 309, 312, 61 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1953); Lacey v. Lacey, 45
Wis. 2d 378, 383, 173 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1970). That such a standard is de-
fined sufficiently to survive constitutional challenge is apparently conceded
by all parties. Even where it is not, however, the court may avoid the
issue. In In re Eleventh Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 130 N.J. Eq. 414, 418,
21 A.2d 746, 748 (E.&A. 1941), cited in Painter, the issue was raised that
the standard of "fair and equitable" was void for vagueness. The court
there did not answer this allegation directly. Instead, it held that the judi-
cial plan under attack had met the standard under the circumstances.
51. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 211, 320 A.2d 484, 491 (1974) (citing
Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 567, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102, 399 P.2d 897,
902 (1965)). Every state except Louisiana considers the distribution to be
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The supreme court then offered several criteria for the guid-
ance of the lower courts in effectuating equitable distributions in
individual cases:
Guideline criteria over the broad spectrum of litiga-
tion in this area include: (1) respective age, background
and earning ability of the parties; (2) duration of the mar-
riage; (3) the standard of living of the parties during the
marriage; (4) what money or property each brought into
the marriage; (5) the present income of the parties; (6)
the property acquired during the marriage by either or
both parties; (7) the source of acquisition; (8) the current
Values and income producing capacity of the property;
(9) the debts and liabilities of the parties to the marriage;
(10) the present mental and physical health of the parties;
(11) the probability of continuing present employment at
present earnings or better in the future; (12) the effect of
distribution of assets on the ability to pay alimony and
support; and (13) gifts from one spouse to another during
marriage.
5 2
These criteria are virtually identical with those enumerated in
numerous other jurisdictions. 53 The criteria are intended to reveal
the relative equities of the parties in the assets to be distributed.
They may logically be subdivided into four categories. The first
category examines the property itself, its current value, and its in-
come producing capacity. The second considers the relative equities
of each party in the ownership of the property, based primarily
on the source of acquisition. While assets obtained by one party
through gift, bequest, or devise cannot be excluded from distribu-
tion, the manner of procurement is properly a criterion to be con-
sidered within the distribution itself.54 The third examines the
relative future needs of each party, based upon the respective age,
present income, mental and physical condition, potential earning
ability, and current debts and liabilities of each. The fourth con-
siders the duration of the marriage. This is because a very brief
marriage does not generally support a party's claims of equitable
rights in assets obtained by the other through, for example, gift,
made upon a "just," "equitable," "fair," "right," or similar standard. For
individual state statutes, see note 5 supra.
52. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 211, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974) (citing
Painter v. Painter, 118 N.J. Super. 332, 335, 287 A.2d 467, 469 (Ch. Div.
1972)).
53. See, e.g., Mullaly v. Mullaly, 518 P.2d 1395, 1397 (Alaska 1974);
Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812, 817, 135 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1965);
Novlesky v. Novlesky, 206 N.W.2d 865, 869 (N.D. 1973); Lacey v. Lacey,
45 Wis. 2d 378, 383-84, 173 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1970); and Tischler, Distribution
of Property Upon Divorce, 94 N.J.L.J. 1109, 1116 (1971).
54. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 211, 320 A.2d 484 492 (1974).
bequest, or devise. Economic interdependence of the spouses does
not usually manifest itself to a significant extent in such a mar-
riage.55
The Painter court's rationale for enumerating these guidelines
is two-fold. While the term "equitable," without more, is constitu-
tionally sufficient to define the distribution specified by the legisla-
ture," the application of that term to individual fact situations
would present great difficulty to the lower courts. Furthermore,
the lack of additional definition would cause a great number of
appeals alleging abuse of judicial discretion. Either of these conse-
quences would increase the burden on an already overtaxed judici-
ary. Consistent application of the suggested guidelines will pre-
vent this. However, the court emphasized that the factors cannot
be applied blindly; each case must be decided on its own facts.5 7
The proffered criteria are neither complete in their scope nor man-
datory in their application. Wide latitude in their use is implicitly
sanctioned. This is in accord with the universal rule among states
with equitable distribution provisions; the broad discretion which
is inherently vested in the courts of those states in applying this
standard to individual cases has been expressly upheld as within
their authority. 58
The court then examined the final and most significant consti-
tutional issue: whether the statute was impermissibly vague in
55. Conspicuously, though not expressly, absent as a criterion in the
allocation of assets is any consideration of fault or misconduct. The idea
of ignoring fault in the distribution of property is not universal. While the
majority of states do not consider fault as a bar to the right of distribution,
see Tischler, Distribution of Property Upon Divorce, 94 N.J.L.J. 1109, 1116
(1971), many hold that it is a legitimate factor within the distribution it-
self. E.g., Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 255 Minn. 80, 90, 96 N.W.2d 14, 23 (1959);
Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812, 817, 135 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1965);
Novlesky v. Novlesky, 206 N.W.2d 865, 869 (N.D. 1973); Lacey v. Lacey,
45 Wis. 2d 378, 383-84, 173 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1970); contra, In re Marriage of
Bare, - Iowa -, 203 N.W.2d 551, 555 (1973); Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d
821, 826 (Ky. 1970). However, the Painter position is consistent with the
idea that the state's new divorce statute is intended to de-emphasize the
role of fault in the dissolution of the marriage.
56. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
57. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 212, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974). Ac-
cord Vanover v. Vanover, 496 P.2d 644, 648 (Alaska 1968); Bell v. Bell, 150
Colo. 174, 177, 371 P.2d 773, 774 (1962); Reitz v. Reitz, 338 Mich. 309, 313,
61 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1953); Krohn v. Krohn, 284 Minn. 95, 98, 169 N.W.2d
389, 391 (1969); Workman v. Workman, 164 Neb. 642, 650, 83 N.W.2d 368,
374 (1957); Agrest v. Agrest, 75 N.D. 318, 329, 27 N.W.2d 697, 703 (1947);
Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 383, 173 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1970).
58. E.g., Vanover v. Vanover, 496 P.2d 644, 648 (Alaska 1968); Bell
v. Bell, 150 Colo. 174, 177, 371 P.2d 773, 774 (1962); Reitz v. Reitz, 338 Mich.
309, 313, 61 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1953); Workman v. Workman, 164 Neb. 642, 650,
83 N.W.2d 368, 374 (1957); Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 783-84, 52 N.W.2d 107,
111 (1952); McCoy v. McCoy, 429 P.2d 999, 1004 (Okla. 1967); Bryant v.
Bryant, 478 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Friedlander v. Fried-
lander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 305, 494 P.2d 208, 215 (1972); Lacey v. Lacey, 45
Wis. 2d 378, 383, 173 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1970); Allen v. Allen, 132 Vt. 182,
185, 315 A.2d 459, 461, 462 (1974).
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failing to specify what assets are to be eligible for equitable distri-
bution.5 9 Appellant's allegation of vagueness was dismissed.60 The
court noted that the purpose of the distribution provision is to di-
vide the property between the spouses in a fair manner. The fact
that this might require judicial interpretation in specific instances
was held insufficient to render the provision void.6' The court pro-
ceeded, however, to set down mandatory rules rather than guide-
lines on the questions of eligibility.
Initially, the court exempted from distribution property
brought into the marriage by either spouse.62 This decision was
based upon the express language of the statute.63 However, the
court's further holdings, which were based upon this exemption of
previously-owned property, are not easily reconcilable with the
court's professed reluctance to adopt rules of community property. 4
The first such holding stated that any increase in the value
of property brought into the marriage by either spouse is also in-
eligible. 65 The court announced that this rule might not "neces-
sarily" apply in situations in which the increase is due to the contri-
butions of the other spouse or of both spouses jointly.6 How the
court clarifies its position on this issue in future decisions will re-
veal whether it is actually seeking to avoid the adoption of com-
munity property rules. The holding at present exceeds the breadth
of the exemption granted under the community property concept.
67
The second holding ruled that all profits derived from ineligible
59. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 213, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974). In
all cases in which assets are claimed ineligible for distribution, the claiming
party must sustain the burden of proof. This is in accord with the practice
in community property states. 4A R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY
722, 723 (rev. ed. 1973).
63. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
65. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974).
66. Id. at 214, 320 A.2d at 493, n.4.
67. The civil code recognizes a distinction between increases in the
value of separate property which are attributable to the efforts of one or
both spouses and increases which are due merely to an upswing in market
values. Only such accretions which are not the product of spousal effort
may remain "separate" property and thus ineligible for distribution upon
divorce. Thus, if a spouse brings corporate stock into the marriage and
has no control over its market price, the rule is that any increase in value,
as well as the original value, will remain separate property. However, if
the corporation involved is merely the alter ego of one of the spouses, any
increase in its value is considered the result of that spouse's efforts, and,
hence, it becomes community property eligible for distribution.
property or the income derived from the sale or exchange thereof
is also to be considered ineligible.68 The rule of community prop-
erty on this question is in conflict. At civil law, the fruits and
profits of separate property are considered community property if
obtained during the marriage.69 Thus they are eligible for distribu-
tion. Five community property states70 have rejected this rule and
consider such assets separate. The remaining three,7 1 however, con-
tinue to consider such assets to be community property, eligible
for distribution. Since the Painter court professed a reluctance to
adopt the rules of community property which render assets ineligi-
ble for distribution,7 2 it is logical that the court would have held
in accord with the view of the latter three states, rather than with
that of the former five.
On the issue of the eligibility of assets obtained by a spouse
through gift or inheritance, however, the court did unequivocally
reject the rule prevalent among the community property states and
found such assets to be eligible for distribution, reversing the su-
perior court.73 This ruling was based upon the court's determina-
tion that the legislature intended that the term "acquired" should
properly include a passive, as well as active, type of procurement.7 4
The court reasoned that if the legislature had intended only the
more restricted meaning of "acquired," it would have so stated
within the statute.7 5 In addition, the Painter court refused to vali-
date the lower court's definition of the term because of its reluc-
tance to incorporate a rule of the civil code 76 into a statute of a
68. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974).
69. 1 W. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNrIY PROPERY 180 (1943).
70. Id. at 181, 182. The states are Arizona, California, Nevada, New
Mexico, and Washington.
71. Id. at 181. The states are Idaho, Louisiana, and Texas.
72. See note 37 and accompanying text-supra.
73. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974).
74. Id. at 215, 320 A.2d at 494. The superior court had defined "ac-
quired" as "attained by the individual by his own efforts," citing WzBsTm's
THD NEW INTERmATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1965). The supreme court
defined the term as "gained by any means." This more comprehensive defi-
nition has been accepted in many decisions. E.g. Crutchfield v. Johnson
& Latimar, 243 Ala. 73, 76, 8 So. 2d 412, 414 (1942); Weinberg v. Baltimore
& Annapolis R.R., 200 Md. 160, 165, 88 A.2d 575, 577 (1952); Commissioner
of Ins. v. Broad St. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 261, 263, 44 N.E.2d 683,
684 (1942); Chief Freight Lines v. Industrial Commission, 366 S.W.2d 48,
53 (Mo. 1963).
75. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 494 (1974).
76. Actually, the civil law was much less rigid on the question of the
ineligibility of gifts or inheritances than are the present statutes of the com-
munity property states which exclude all assets so obtained. The early
Spanish code made a distinction between remunerative gifts, those obtained
obviously in return for services rendered, and donative gifts, which were
obtained from one with purely charitable motives. Remunerative gifts
were taken by "onerous title" and were considered community property.
Donative gifts were taken by "lucrative title" and were considered separate
property. This distinction reflected the idea that any asset obtained
through the effort of either or both spouses was community property. The
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common law state absent specific legislative direction.17
The result, if not the approach, of the Painter decision on the
issue of the distributive eligibility of assets obtained through gift
or inheritance is in accord with holdings of other common law states
where this question has arisen; in the absence of legislative man-
date in those states, assets so obtained are not excluded on that basis
from distribution upon divorce. 78 The Painter ruling is also more
consonant with the purpose79 of equitable distribution than is the
contrary rule of exclusion. Often the fact that a gift or inheritance
has been brought into the marriage, even if it is left untouched
in a bank account, influences the action of both spouses in decisions
such as whether or not to seek or maintain present employment.
If, for example, a wife leaves her job because her husband has in-
herited a large sum and her extra earnings are no longer essential,
it is patently unfair to withhold from the wife upon divorce a share
of that sum or the assets purchased with it. This also applies in
cases in which the spouse who is not the recipient of the gift or
inheritance continues to work in order to keep the windfall in
reserve.8 0
The final holding of the Painter court was a determination of
the date upon which the marriage should be considered terminated
for purposes of distribution."' The necessity for this determination
is obvious; assets obtained after the marriage has ended are ex-
pressly immune from distribution under the statute.8 2 The court
decided that the period of marriage ends on the date on which
either party files a complaint requesting a judgment of divorce ss
distinction was apparently blurred in the transmutation of the civil code
into the statutes of the community property states. See 1 W. DEFuNIAK,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 179 (1943).
77. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 216, 217, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974).
78. Campbell v. Campbell, - Ala. -, 285 So. 2d 105, 107 (1973);
Santilli v. Santilli, 169 Colo. 49, 52, 453 P.2d 606, 608 (1969); Almquist v.
Almquist, 214 Kan. 788, 792, 522 P.2d 383, 386 (1974); Zimmers v. Zimners,
346 Mich. 28, 34-35, 77 N.W.2d 267, 270, 271 (1956); Reitz v. Reitz, 338 Mich.
309, 61 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1953); Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812, 817, 135
N.W.2d 704, 707 (1965); Williams v. Williams, 428 P.2d 218, 222 (Okla.
1967).
79. The theory behind the distribution of property upon divorce is
based upon a recognition that both spouses contribute to the economic suc-
cess of the marriage even though only one, usually the husband, may be
earning the income with which the assets of the marriage are obtained.
Therefore, upon dissolution of the marital relationship, both spouses are en-
titled to a share of such property regardless of in whom the title rests. See
Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (1974).
80. See Santilli v. Santilli, 169 Colo. 49, 52, 453 P.2d 606, 608 (1969).
81. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 218, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974).
82. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
83. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 218, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974).
This decision was based upon the rejection of two hypothetical
"straw-man" alternatives. 84 The first of these would consider the
marriage terminated upon the date of the judgment of divorce. The
court acknowledged that this represents the literal meaning of the
statutory language. 85 However, the value assigned to each asset
for purposes of distribution is the value as of the date of the termi-
nation of the marriage. If the date of the judgment of divorce
is also the date of the end of the marriage, subsequent hearings
would be required to determine the value of the assets.8 6 The bur-
den and expense of such additional adjudications make their avoid-
ance desirable if possible. The second alternative would consider
the marriage terminated upon the date of an occurrence which
establishes a cause of action for divorce or at least reveals the exist-
ence of an "irretrievable breakdown" in the marital relationship.
S7
The court observed that this would be the most equitable solution.88
However, it noted that application of this rule would be impossible
in the majority of cases in which an inextricable network of fac-
tors combine to undermine the marriage.8 9
The Painter theory of equitable distribution of marital assets
recognizes the economic interdependence of the spouses during mar-
riage and seeks to equalize their relative economic positions upon
termination of the marital relation. The most appropriate means
of effectuating this just result is to require the distribution of all
assets which contributed to the economic maintenance of the
spouses, regardless of the manner by which such assets were ob-
tained. Through its rulings in Painter v. Painter the New Jersey
Supreme Court has taken a significant step in that direction.
JoHN A. Covno






PRODUCTS LIABILITY-REQUIREMENT OF HORI-
ZONTAL PRIVITY ABOLISHED IN ACTIONS
BY NON-BUYER CLAIMANTS AGAINST
VENDORS UNDER U.C.C. SECTION 2-318
Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903
(1974)
In Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.,1 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, having found that "the theoretical foundation
which once supported horizontal privity has been undermined,"
2
held that "lack of horizontal privity itself may no longer bar an
injured party's suit for breach of warranty."'3 This decision over-
rules Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.,4 which had held that an em-
ployee of a buyer could not recover in a breach of warranty action
against a remote seller. The expansion by Salvador of the class
protected by implied warranty under Section 2-318 of the Uniform
Commercial Code 5 marks the fall of the last bastion of privity in
the products liability law of Pennsylvania.
Ahmed Salvador was injured as the result of an explosion of
a steam boiler at his place of employment. As a result of this acci-
dent, he suffered the loss of approximately 77% of his ability to
hear. Salvador brought an action in assumpsit naming as defend-
ants his employer, the retail seller of the boiler and the manufac-
turer of the boiler. The manufacturer filed preliminary objections
on the basis of lack of privity.6 The trial court sustained the objec-
tions, holding that an employee of a purchaser had no standing to
1. 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Salvador].
2. Id. at 26, 319 A.2d at 904.
3. Id.
4. 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 848 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hochgertel].
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318]:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by goods and who is in-
jured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not ex-
clude or limit operation of this section.
For a full discussion of the development and application of U.C.C. § 2-318
see 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 22 (4th ed. Squillante & Fonseca 1974).
6. "Privity of contract is that connection or relationship which exists
between two or more contracting parties." BLACK'S LAw DicvioN-nY 1362
(4th ed. 1951). See 4 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 778 (1951); 3 S. WILLISTON,
SALES § 22-5 (4th ed. Squillante & Fonseca 1974).
bring an action against the manufacturer of a defective product.
On appeal, the superior court reversed, 7 holding that the lack of
horizontal privitys did not bar an employee's action for breach of
implied warranty. 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the
manufacturer's petition for allowance of appeal.
In affirming the decision of the superior court, the supreme
court in Salvador explicitly overruled Hochgertel. The supreme
court's opinion, however, did not emphasize the differences between
Hochgertel and Salvador but rather focused on the evolution in the
law of products liability that caused this ensuing change. The sig-
nificance of this change is apparent in the opinion of Justice Roberts
which concludes:
This is not an occasion when a court reexamines its prece-
dents and finding them in error returns to the "correct"
view. On the contrary, as we have said, when Hochgertel
was decided it was clearly the appropriate accommodation
between the law of torts and the law of contracts. Since
then Pennsylvania products liability law has progressed
and demands of public policy as well as legal symmetry
compel today's decision.10
Therefore, to place Salvador in the proper perspective it is neces-
sary to review the state of Pennsylvania law at the time of Hoch-
gertel and to examine the demands of public policy and legal sym-
metry that led to the Salvador decision.
The period in which Hochgertel was decided was "a veritable
revolution against the artificial strictures of privity of warranty."1 1
The Pennsylvania courts had long since adopted the rule of Mac-
7. Salvador v. I.H. English of Phila., Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 317, 307 A.2d
398 (1973), aff'd sub nor. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa.
24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
8. Horizontal privity deals with a non-purchaser's ability to bring suit
against one who is on the chain of sales. It has often been discussed in
terms of "who can sue?" Vertical privity concerns a purchaser's ability to
sue someone on the chain of sale other than the immediate vendor. Its
question is "who can be sued?" See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF SALES 282 (1970); 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 15 (4th ed. Squillante & Fo-
nesca 1974); Note, 68 DicK. L. REV. 444, 446 (1964).
9. A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller
of goods contemporaneously with, and as part of, the contract of
sale, although collateral to the express object of it, having reference
to the character, quality or title of the goods, and by which he
promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall be
taken as he represents them. . . . A warranty is implied when the
law derives it by implication of inference from the nature or the
transactions, or the relative situation or circumstances of the
parties.
Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NORE DAME
LAw. 501, 506 (1964). See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES
§ 75 (1970); 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 19 (4th ed. Squillante & Fonseca 1974).
10. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 33, 319 A.2d 903,
908 (1974).
11. Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Toscin Sounded?, 1 Du-
QUESNE L. Rsv. 1 (1963). See PRossHE, The Assault Upon the Citadel: Strict
Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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pherson v. Buick Motors 12 which had eliminated the need for
privity in an action for negligence.' The Pennsylvania courts had
also abolished the privity requirement in warranty actions dealing
with food products for human consumption.' 4 While a number of
courts had suggested that Pennsylvania had already abandoned
privity requirements in all implied warranty cases, 1 the supreme
court in Hochgertel clearly held otherwise. 1
In Hochgertel, a bartender was injured by flying glass from
an exploding bottle which had been purchased by the bartender's
employer. The bartender brought suit against the manufacturer
of the bottle on the basis of implied warranty. The Hochgertel
court ultimately centered on an interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-318.17
Although the court did find that the warranty of fitness extended
to the actual purchaser of the bottle, it found no basis for extending
this warranty to an employee of the purchaser 18 The court rea-
soned that an employee was definitely not included in any of the
categories enumerated in comment 319 to U.C.C. § 2-318 but because
the comment was neutral to developing case law, a study of Penn-
sylvania authorities was undertaken. 2 From this study, the court
12. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
13. The first Pennsylvania case to apply Macpherson was Ebbert v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 232 (1938).
14. See, e.g., Caskie v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d
901 (1953); Cantini v. Swift, 251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1916); Noch v. Coca
Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
15. Mansz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); Thompson
v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,
191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
16. The decision in Hochgertel came as a surprise to some scholars in
the products liability field. See Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the
Toscin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1963). See also Murray, Pennsyl-
vania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search for a Clear and Un-
derstandable Rule, 33 U. PiTt. L. REv. 391, 398-99 (1972).
17. See note 5 supra.
18. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 613, 187 A.2d 575,
576-77 (1963).
19. UNIoRM COMMmCiAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this,
the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to
his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain.
20. In reference to the court's interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-318, Profes-
sor Murray states:
Apparently, the court read the comment as suggesting that if the
case law in a particular jurisdiction had extended the categories
beyond those stated in section 2-318 prior to the enactment of the
Code, it was not the intention of the drafters to restrict the cate-
gories set forth in the section. However, the converse must be true:
if the case law had not extended the categories beyond 2-318 clas-
concluded that with the exception of cases involving food no war-
ranty would be implied in favor of one who is not in the category
of a purchaser.2 1 Further the Hochgertel court saw no policy con-
sideration that would compel a broader interpretation of U.C.C. §
2-318. In fact, if public policy played a role, it was to reinforce
the privity requirements:
22
To grant such an extension of the warranty, as urged here-
in, would in effect render the manufacturer a guarantor
of his product and impose liability i all such accident
cases even if the utmost degree of care was exercised. This
would lead to harsh and unjust results.
23
Within a year, Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co.,2 4 a case factually
similar to Hochgertel, reached a different conclusion. In Yentzer,
an employee of a hotel was injured when the cork from a wine
bottle popped and struck him in the eye. In granting the plaintiff
a cause of action against the manufacturer, Yentzer was distin-
guished from Hochgertel on the basis that the employee in Yentzer
had been the actual purchaser of the product. The Yentzer court
reasoned that since the plaintiff was cast in the important role of
buyer, the fact that he was an employee did not bar his cause of
action in implied warranty.
25
The decision in Yentzer, however, did not mark the demise of
the privity requirement. In 1966, on the basis of Hochgertel,26 the
sifications prior to the enactment of the Code, then the categories
of 2-318 constitute the furthest extensions-the categories were
frozen by 2-318 and further development through "developing case
law" is impossible.
Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search for
a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rsv. 391, 400, (1972).
21. The Hochgertel court based its conclusion that under Pennsylvania
case law no warranty would be implied for a nonpurchaser on the case of
Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953). In that case, a woman
was injured by an exploding soda bottle which had just been removed from
a supermarket shelf by her husband. Because there was no purchase in-
volved, Loch did not deal with horizontal privity, but rather with vertical
privity in a negligence suit based on the doctrines of exclusive control and
res ipsa loquitor. It was nevertheless held by the H'ochgrtel court to es-
tablish horizontal privity as a part of Pennsylvania law.
22. Throughout the history of Anglo-American law, courts have
been hesitant to hold a defendant to a duty which would unduly
restrict either his personal freedom or his economic well-being.
The law has always encouraged the expansion of business. This
encouragement has had as a by-product a certain amount of in-
justice to the consumer.
Note, Product Liability: Employees and the UniforTm Commercial Code
Section 2-318, 68 DicK L. Rzv. 444 (1964). The Hochgertel court seems
to be following this traditional line of emphasizing the interests of business
over those of the consumer.
23. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 615-16, 187 A.2d 575,
578 (1963).
24. 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1966).
25. Id. at 275, 199 A.2d at 464.
26. Although Hochgertel dealt with horizontal privity, the court found
its reasoning to apply, albeit with some confusion, to a case concerned with
vertical privity. See Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarifi-
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need for vertical privity27 was affirmed in the case of Miller v.
Preitz.28 The Miller court was willing to extend the protection of
the category of "family" under U.C.C. § 2-318 beyond the immediate
members of a household, but still required privity of contract for
an assumpsit action against a remote seller.2 9
Together with Miller, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued
its opinion in the case of Webb v. Zern.30 As anticipated in Miller,"
the court in Webb adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts." Notwithstanding an emphatic dissent,38 the re-
cation of the Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 391, 405 (1972).
27. See note 8 supra.
28. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
29. Id. at 392, 221 A.2d at 325. The Miller decision, nevertheless, evi-
denced a marked change in attitude from Hochgertel. The majority opinion
recognizes the policy considerations in imposing strict liability in tort and
stated that "a similar result would follow from abandoning the requirement
of 'privity of contract' in warranty actions." Id. at 393, 221 A.2d at 333.
30. 422 Pa. 424, 20 A.2d 853 (1966).
31. Both Justices Jones and Roberts advocated the adoption of RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tors § 402A (1965) in their separate concurring
and dissenting opinions. Justice Jones stated:
The public, with justification, expects that in the case of products
of which it has a need and for which it must rely upon those who
make any market the product, such manufacturers, be they proxi-
mate or remote stand behind their products; the burden of injuries
caused by defects in such products should fall upon those who make
and market the products and the consuming public is entitled to
the maximum of protection. Only through the imposition of liabil-
ity under the provisions of Section 402 (a) can this be accomplished.
Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 411-12, 221 A.2d 320, 334-35 (1966). See also
id. at 421-22, 221 A.2d at 339-40 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Roberts).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRds § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or his property, if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
For commentary on strict liability in tort for defective products see gener-
ally Keeton, Products Liability-Liability without Fault and the Require-
ment of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. RV. 855 (1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel: Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L. REv. 1099 (1960);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TtwN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
19 Sw. ILJ. 5 (1965).
quirement of proof of negligence in a trespass action for a defective
product was eliminated.
In view of the Webb holding, the supreme court found it neces-
sary to reconsider its previous opinion in regard to vertical privity.
Prior to the adoption of Section 402A, it was felt that legal sym-
metry demanded the maintenance of privity. After the adoption
of strict liability in tort, however, that same legal symmetry seemed
to require that the need for privity in implied warranty actions
be eliminated in order to provide equal liability in tort and con-
tract.3 4  Thus, the supreme court in Kassab v. Central Soya 5
abolished vertical privity.36 Concluding that the result was a
natural consequence of Section 402A, the court stated:
[P] nor to the adoption of section 402A, it could be said to
dispense with privity would be to allow recovery in con-
tract without proof of negligence, while requiring a show-
ing of negligence in order to recover for the same wrong
against the same defendant if the suit were brought in tort.
To permit the result of a lawsuit to depend solely on the
caption atop plaintiff's complaint is not now, and never has
been, a sound resolution of identical controversies.
3 7
While much of the reasoning in Kassab was applicable as a basis
to eliminate horizontal privity, Hochgertel was expressly left un-
touched by this decision.3 Thus, the question was raised whether
the supreme court was only looking for a better fact situation in
which to eliminate horizontal privity or whether the court intended
to maintain the narrow interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-318.
The Salvador case presented the chance to answer that ques-
tion. The superior court 9 found that Kassab provided ample au-
thority to abolish the horizontal privity requirement. The court
reasoned that the policy arguments in Hochgertel were moot. The
adoption of Section 402A had made a manufacturer a guarantor of
his product. Further, to eliminate the requirement of horizontal
privity would not impose any greater liability on the manufacturer
than already existed in tort.40 The superior court agreed with Kas-
33. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Bell found that the decision
of the majority was "not only unfair but absolutely unjustified in justice
or in law." Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 429, 220 A.2d 853, 855 (1966).
34. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 230, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968).
35. Id. at 217, 246 A.2d at 848. The case had been appealed on pro-
cedural questions. The plaintiff had mentioned nothing about privity in his
brief and the defendant had treated it only superficially. The concurring
opinion by Justice Cohen states that the majority should have awaited a
"better opportunity" to completely change the traditional doctrine of priv-
ity. Id. at 240, 246 A.2d at 859.
36. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 856.
37. Id. at 229, 246 A.2d at 853.
38. Id. at 232 n.8, 246 A.2d at 855 n.8.
39. Salvador v. I.H. English of Phila., Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 307 A.2d
398 (1973).
40. Id. at 385, 307 A.2d at 403.
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sab that the Code must be co-extensive with Section 402A 41 and
utilized Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-318 as a basis to abolish horizontal
privity.42 Possibly with an eye toward a supreme court which had
displayed a concern for form and purity of pleading in regard to
products liability actions,48 the superior court noted in conclusion
that the action for breach of warranty was originally in tort rather
than contract. 44 Thus, the contractual theory of the action for
breach of warranty was done no harm by the elimination of the re-
quirement of privity.
45
The supreme court relied heavily upon the superior court's ap-
plication of Kassab's symmetry arguments in the context of hori-
zontal privity. The supreme court opinion written by Justice
Roberts began by noting that Kassab had eliminated the require-
ment of vertical privity in actions for breach of warranty, leaving
unresolved for Salvador the single issue of "whether horizontal
privity should likewise be abandoned. '46 Having found that the
need for privity under U.C.C. § 2-318 was eliminated by the adop-
tion of strict liability in tort, the court concluded that U.C.C. § 2-
318 must be enlarged so that it is co-extensive with Section
402A in the case of products liability.47 As did the superior court,
41. Id. at 383, 307 A.2d at 402.
42. Id. at 382, 307 A.2d at 401. While the superior court made no ref-
erence to the contrary interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-318 in Hochgertel, it noted
that other jurisdictions have found the section to be no bar to an employee's
right to sue for breach of implied warranty and cites Speed Fasteners, Inc.
v. Newson, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967), and Delta Oxygen Co. v. Swift, 238
Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964), as examples. The court in Speed Fasteners
held that an injured employee stands in the shoes of his employer in the
ability to sue on an implied warranty. 382 F.2d at 398. In Delta, it was
found that the requirement of horizontal privity in a case in which the pur-
chaser had been a corporation would effectively insulate the manufacturer
from suit because "a corporation could hardly have a burned arm or broken
leg." 238 Ark. at 546, 383 S.W.2d at 893.
43. Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion in Miller, cites "a desire
to maintain doctrinal purity and to compel adherence to strict forms of
pleading," as the reasons for the court's maintaining vertical privity while
at the same time recognizing strict liability in tort. Miller v. Preitz, 422
Pa. 383, 415, 221 A.2d 320, 336 (1966) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
44. See Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Haav. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888);
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Toscin Sounded?, 1 DuQUESNE L.
REV. 1, 6-27 (1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel: Strict Liability
to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126-1127 (1960); W. PRossER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAw or Toirs, 634-35 (4th ed. 1971).
45. Salvador v. I.E English of Phila., Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 385-86,
307 A.2d 398, 407 (1973).
46. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 25, 319 A.2d 903,
904 (1974).
47. Id. at 31, 319 A.2d at 907 (quoting Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa.
218, 228-29, 231, 246 A.2d 848, 853, 854 (1968)).
the supreme court found that the thrust of Kassab was the desire
to reach the same result in a.products liability suit whether brought
in tort or contract.48 The supreme court also agreed with the su-
perior court's conclusion that these arguments, while dealing in
Kassab only with vertical privity, apply as well for horizontal
privity.4
9
The supreme court's decision was, however, more than an echo
of the reasoning of the superior court. The Roberts opinion, by
tracing the history of Pennsylvania products liability law since
Hochgertel, emphasized the evolution in this area of the law. The
significance of this gradual change is apparent in the summary of
Hochgertel. Although no criticism is made of Hochgertel's limited
application of U.C.C. § 2-318, the court illustrates an alternative ap-
proach in Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.,5O which held an employee
to be a part of the employer's industrial family.51 Similarly, Justice
Roberts also noted Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 2 which stated that
in light of Kassab, Hochgertel "would be reversed by a reasonable
intelligent lawyer sitting on that court today."
53
The court continues its emphasis on this gradual change in
products liability by stating that Justice Eagen's dissent in Yentzer
v. Taylor Wine Co.54 "properly pointed out that the [Yentzer]
court's analysis represented a clear departure from Hochgertel."55
Even Miller v. Preitz5 6 is evidence of this change in light of Justice
(now Chief Justice) Jones's dissent, which is quoted by the Salva-
dor court in a footnote.57 While believing the concept of privity
unsound, Jones felt that if it must be retained it should extend to
48. Id. at 26-27, 319 A.2d at 905.
49. Id. at 31, 319 A.2d at 905.
50. 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
51. [lIt is a matter of common knowledge, and of course known
to the vendor manufacturers, that most businesses are carried on
by means of the assistance of employees and that equipment or sup-
plies purchased by the employers will in actual use be handled by
the employees, who in that respect may be said to stand in the
shoes of the employer.
Id. at 347, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 869, 353 P.2d at 581. See also Speed Fastners,
Inc. v. Newson, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Delta Oxygen Co. v. Swift,
238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964); Murray v. Bullard Co., 110 N.H. 220,
265 A.2d 309 (1970). But see Haragan v. Union Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392
(D. Alas. 1970); Hargrove v. Newsome, 225 Tenn. 462, 470 S.W.2d 348
(1971).
52. 346 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Pa. 1972). But see Tucker v. Capital Ma-
chine, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
53. 346 F. Supp. at 992.
54. 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1966).
55. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 29, 319 A.2d 903,
906 (1974) (quoting Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 277, 199 A.2d
463, 465 (1964)).
56. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966). See notes 26-29 and accompany-
ing text supra.
57. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 30 n.12, 319 A.2d




any person whom the seller could have foreseen would use, con-
sume, or be affected by the product.
Justice Roberts explored the policy reasons behind the evolu-
tion in products liability law. He focuses on the Hochgertel court's
concern for the "fate" of the manufacturer. Noting that after
Webb, a manufacturer would be faced with strict liability, Roberts
found that there was no social benefit in allowing a manufacturer
to avoid liability after having marketed a defective product.58 In
fact, the "harsh and unjust" results feared by the Hochgertel court
are now "worked on the plaintiff who may recover for his injury
or loss if his complaint is in trespass, but on identical facts would
be denied relief if the pleading is captioned 'Complaint in Assump-
sit.' 1,59
By the elimination of the requirement of horizontal privity
under U.C.C. § 2-318, Pennsylvania law seems to have finally
reached the interpretation intended by those who drafted the Uni-
form Commercial Code twenty-five years before the Salvador deci-
sion.60 However, removal of the final barrier to a manufacturer's
liability for a defective product does not necessarily end the confu-
sion which has plagued the field of products liability. Problems
arise when rules designed for commercial purposes are adapted to
apply in the realm of tort. One possible area of confusion is the
application of the statute of limitations of the U.C.C.6 1 in a claim
58. Id. The court mentions three policy reasons for the abolition of
privity: public interest in the protection of human life; responsibility to
the public imposed on the manufacturer through marketing and advertising
his product; and avoiding multiplicity of actions by allowing a direct action
by an injured party against a manufacturer. Id. at 33 n.15, 319 A.2d at 908
n.15 (quoting W. PossER, HAaDBoox OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 97 at 650-61
(4th ed. 1971)).
59. Id. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
60. UNiFoRM ComvmcmI. CoDE § 2-318 (1949 Draft):
A warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who is in the family or household of the buyer or whose rela-
tionship is such to make it reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section.
Apparently the third category in this section-those who could be reason-
able expected to use the product-was deleted by the drafting committee
to insure adoption of the Code by states whose case law was in conflict
with this provision. Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform
Commercial Code, Section 2-318, 68 DIcK. L. REv. 444, 447 (1963). See Re-
port No. 3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code (1967) ("Reason for Change" in 1966 Recommended Amendments to
§ 2-318); Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the
Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 391, 396-
98 (1972)).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725 (1970) provides in part:
for personal injuries. 2 Hopefully, in approaching these prospective
problems the courts will keep in mind the rationale of the Kassab
decision that "[t] o permit the result of a lawsuit to depend solely
on the caption atop the plaintiff's complaint is not now, or ever
has been, a sound resolution of identical controversies." ' 3  Having
finally formulated a coherent products liability rule, technicalities
in form and pleading should not be allowed to once again bar meri-
torious claims.
ROBERT T. EBEnT
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.
By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period
of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, ex-
cept that where a warranty explicitly extends to future per-
formance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
62. There is no discussion of the question of the statute of limitations
in the supreme court opinion in Salvador. The superior court touches on
it only briefly. No problem was found in applying the four year limit for
a contract action, ostensibly with the cause of action accruing at the time
of injury. As a basis for this conclusion the superior court cites Gardner
v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1965), in which the
four year statute of limitations under U.C.C. § 2-725 was held to apply for
an assumpsit action for personal injuries. No reference, however, was made
in the Gardner case as to when the cause of action accrued. The superior
court did not cite Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612
(1963). In this case an action for breach of warranty was barred because
the complaint was filed more than four years after the date on which the
plaintiff had taken control of the defective product.
Such an application of U.C.C. § 2-725 could lead to a situation in which
one's cause of action for personal injury is barred by the statute of limita-
tions before there is any injury. This would occur when the injury happens
more than four years after the purchase of the product, the point at which
the statute begins to run. For a full discussion of this problem see Murray,
Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search for a Clear
and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 391, 416-21 (1972); Murray,
Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U. PiTT. L. REv. 255, 260-66 (1973).
63. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 229, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968).
